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INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN IRELAND:  
THROUGH RECESSION, TOWARDS RECOVERY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper provides an overview of how Ireland’s income distribution evolved 
over the Great Recession and the early years of the recovery. Three distinct 
perspectives are used to give a rounded view. First, the standard approach in the 
literature on income distribution, focusing on ‘snapshots’ of the income 
distribution at the beginning and end of the recession. These results suggest that 
the Gini coefficient was increased slightly between 2008 and 2013, but fell back to 
the 2008 level by 2015. During the crisis (2008-2013) income fell by more than 
average at the bottom of the distribution and less than average for the top 
income deciles. Second, detailed investigation of how household incomes 
changed from year to year finds that the sharp falls for the bottom income decile 
during this period arose mainly from falls in income for those who were initially in 
a higher income decile but experienced substantial losses in income. Third we find 
that the automatic stabilisation impact of Ireland’s tax-transfer system at the start 
of the recession played a strong role in limiting the increase in inequality over the 
period. Discretionary policy changes in direct tax and welfare played a supporting 
role in this regard. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Has inequality increased or remained constant over the years of the Great 
Recession? What role has tax and welfare policy played in shaping the outcomes? 
And are there new trends in the distribution of income as Ireland emerges from 
the years of recession and austerity? These questions have attracted considerable 
attention over recent years, with divergent views as to what actually happened to 
incomes, and the impact of austerity policies. Here we draw on the latest 
available data and on some new types of analysis to provide an overview of how 
income inequality has evolved in Ireland during the recession and in the early 
years of recovery, and the impact of tax and transfer policies in arriving at these 
outcomes. There will of course be differences in views on what constitute 
desirable distributional goals and policies, but our analysis allows debate on such 
topics to be conducted on the basis of firm evidence. 
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We use three different approaches to examine these issues. First, we use the 
standard tools of income distribution analysis to examine the distribution of 
income across households over the 2008 to 2015 period. These standard 
measures relate to ‘snapshots’ of the income distribution1 taken at yearly 
intervals. Thus, when taken from year to year, it provides an analysis of ‘income 
positions’ or ‘income slots’ rather than people. This is by far the most common 
approach in the international literature on trends in income inequality. 
 
Our second approach looks at how some of the key results from these cross 
sections are to be interpreted, drawing on new findings regarding movements in 
income for individuals from year to year. The CSO’s Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions follows a substantial proportion of individuals from year to year so that 
income changes can be measured. This allows for new insights into how the cross-
sectional results are generated. 
 
Our third focus is on the role of tax and welfare policy. Much of the debate about 
policy impact has centred on the effects of policy changes, such as tax increases 
and cuts in welfare payment rates on the distribution of income.2 There is, 
however, another policy effect: the impact of the pre-existing tax/transfer system 
when faced with changed economic circumstances such as greatly increased 
unemployment. Here we report new findings from Savage et al. (2017) which help 
to identify the extent of this ‘automatic stabilisation’ effect during the crisis 
period, which depends on the structure of the pre-existing tax-transfer system.3 
2. INCOME INEQUALITY: A CROSS-SECTIONAL VIEW 
Before considering evidence on the household income distribution, we examine 
how average household incomes measured by the Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) changed over the 2008-2013 period, and how this relates to the 
evidence from national accounts statistics. The Great Recession brought to an end 
a long period of rising household incomes. GNP per capita, illustrated in Figure 1, 
did not grow in 2007 and fell sharply in 2008 and 2009.  
 
We plot household incomes from SILC with a lag of one year, partly reflecting the 
fact that SILC incomes are measured with respect to the 12 months prior to 
 
                                                          
 
1  These are referred to as ‘repeated cross sections’. 
2  A notable exception is FitzGerald (2014) who stressed the redistribution arising from the pre-existing tax and transfer 
system. 
3  This paper draws from existing research by the SWITCH team, based mainly on the recession period (2008-2013). 
Where possible, we also provide up-to-date analysis based on the latest available household income microdata in 
Ireland, SILC 2015.  
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interview. Household incomes (mean real disposable income per adult equivalent) 
track the fall in GNP, with the exception of a timing difference in the 2009-2010 
years. Household incomes did not fall as fast as the initial GNP shock in 2009, but 
fell while GNP rose in 2010, so that over the two-year period both income 
measures fell by similar proportions. The gap between GNP and household 
income changes in these years could be interpreted as reflecting some smoothing 
of the shock to household incomes by tax and welfare policy.  
 
FIGURE 1 GNP AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME GROWTH, 2006-2013 
 
 
Source:  CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions, 2006-2013; CSO National Income Accounts 2015. 
Notes:  Incomes in SILC refer to a 12-month period prior to interview. Given that fieldwork is spread evenly through the year, the 
average lag in incomes is approximately six months. Divergences between household income and GNP are to be expected 
on several grounds, including policy ‘smoothing’ of income changes, and policy lags in the adjustment to recession over 
this period – hence the use of a 12-month lag in the graph.4 
 
The unemployment rate is a key indicator of the state of the economy and one of 
the most critical influences on household incomes. Figure 2 shows how the 
unemployment rate, close to 5 per cent for the years 2001-2008, rose sharply to a 
peak of 15 per cent in 2012 as the recession took hold. The latest Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions is for 2015, and relates to incomes for the 12 
months prior to the interview date. Given that interviewing is spread evenly 
through the year, the average lag in incomes is approximately six months. This 
means that the incomes recorded in SILC 2015 relate, on average, to a date close 
to end-2014 or early 2015. The unemployment rate at that time was close to 12 
per cent; a 3 percentage point reduction from the peak value of 15 per cent, but 
 
                                                          
 
4  The period covered here pre-dates the 26 per cent recorded growth rate in 2015. The smaller year-to-year impacts of 
earlier multinational activities (such as redomiciled plcs), identified by FitzGerald (2015), do not affect the broad 
point made in relation to Figure 1. 
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with a further 4 percentage point reduction to come in the years 2015 to date. It 
is for this reason that our title refers to ‘Towards Recovery’ – we are looking at 
the impact of the early part of the recovery on incomes and income distribution, 
but the further impact of later reductions in unemployment can only be examined 
in the context of later income distribution data. 
 
FIGURE 2  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (ILO DEFINITION), 2000-2017 
 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey, ILO Unemployment Rate, QNQ20. 
 
Has the extent of inequality in household incomes increased over the recession? 
In order to examine this question, we focus on the repeated cross sections (or 
‘snapshots’) of the household income distribution provided by the Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions. We consider both the Gini coefficient, the most 
commonly used summary measure of income inequality, and measures which 
provide a more detailed perspective of income share and income levels at the 
bottom, middle and top of the income distribution. 
 
Table 1 shows the evolution of the Gini coefficient for household disposable 
income for Ireland from 2004 to 2015. What is evident from this table is the broad 
stability of the Gini coefficient over the whole period, despite the major upheavals 
of a boom, bubble and bust in the economy, with unemployment rising from 5 to 
15 per cent and a collapse in the banking system. A small increase in the Gini 
coefficient is evident between 2008 and 2013, where the point estimate rises 
from 30.6 to 32.0. By 2015, the Gini had fallen back to 30.8. Savage et al. (2017) 
find that there is very limited evidence of any statistically significant differences 
between the estimates for individual years. In fact, the hypothesis that inequality 
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is the same, at its average level, over the whole period, cannot be rejected 
statistically.5 Very similar findings are obtained by Savage et al. (2017) when 
looking at incomes net of housing costs. 
 
TABLE 1 GINI COEFFICIENT, IRELAND, 2004-2015 
Year Gini Coefficient 
2004 31.7 
2005 32.3 
2006 32.4 
2007 31.7 
2008 30.6 
2009 29.3 
2010 31.4 
2011 31.1 
2012 31.8 
2013 32.0 
2014 32.0 
2015 30.8 
 
Source: CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions, 2004-2015. 
 
Table 2 shows how the distribution of income, characterised by the share of 
overall disposable income in each decile, changed between 2008, 2013 and 2015. 
Despite the relatively small increase in the Gini coefficient shown in Table 1, there 
was a more sizable fall in the income share of the bottom decile between 2008 
and 2013. In 2008, the poorest 10 per cent of households had a 3.6 per cent share 
of disposable income.6 By 2013, this had fallen to 3.1 per cent; this represents a 
fall of almost 15 per cent in the share of income in the bottom decile. The top two 
deciles, particularly decile 9, experienced a combined increase of about 1 
percentage point in their share of income. Between 2013 and 2015, the income 
share of the bottom decile recovered to 3.3 per cent. The top decile lost most 
during this period, with its share of income falling from 24.7 to 23.9. 
 
 
                                                          
 
5  An exception to this is in 2009, when the Gini reached an historic low of 29.3. See Callan et al. (2014) for further 
discussion. 
6  Budget 2008 marked the start of major policy initiatives in response to recession. If instead we examine changes 
from 2007 to 2013, the rise in the Gini is smaller, with a fall in the share of the bottom decile still a key feature, 
though somewhat smaller (from 3.4 to 3.1 per cent). 
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TABLE 2 DECILE SHARES OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME, IRELAND, 2008, 2013, 2015 
Decile 2008 2013 2015 
Bottom 3.6 3.1 3.3 
2nd 5.1 4.9 5.0 
3rd 5.9 5.9 5.9 
4th 6.8 6.7 6.8 
5th 7.9 7.7 8.0 
6th 9.1 9.0 9.2 
7th 10.4 10.5 10.5 
8th 12.2 12.4 12.5 
9th 14.7 15.4 15.2 
10th 24.4 24.7 23.9 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions, 2008, 2013. 
 
Of course, increases in decile shares over this period do not reflect increases in 
income levels, rather they reflect losses in income that were smaller than average. 
The distribution of changes in the level of real income by decile is reported in 
Table 3. Most commonly, analysis is undertaken in terms of disposable income, 
without any adjustment for housing costs (i.e. before housing costs). In the UK, 
analysis is often undertaken at both before housing cost (BHC) and after housing 
cost (AHC) levels (e.g. Belfield et al., 2014). The inclusion of housing costs in 
distributional analysis can be justified if the nature of housing purchases means 
that individuals are not free to adjust their housing spending to their current 
income situation – a high mortgage may be a legacy of earlier decisions. This is 
particularly relevant to the situation in which a housing bubble burst, leaving 
many households with high mortgages, while incomes came under pressure via 
unemployment, lower wages and higher taxes. We find, however, that income 
distribution analyses over this period are very similar whether conducted on a 
BHC or AHC basis. Table 3 illustrates this point.  
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TABLE 3 PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY DECILE, IRELAND, BEFORE 
HOUSING COSTS (BHC) AND AFTER HOUSING COSTS (AHC), 2008-2013 
 2008-2013 2013-2015 2008-2013 2013-2015 
Decile BHC AHC 
Bottom -21.1 12.2 -25.6 12.2 
2nd -13.6 8.2 -17.6 9.6 
3rd -9.6 6.4 -14.2 8.1 
4th -10.5 7.8 -12.7 7.5 
5th -11.0 9.2 -13.0 9.5 
6th -9.9 8.0 -12.0 7.6 
7th -8.3 6.8 -11.0 8.3 
8th -7.8 6.8 -6.5 7.1 
9th -5.2 4.7 -6.8 4.7 
10th -8.3 2.7 -9.1 1.8 
All -9.1 6.0 -10.7 6.1 
 
Source: CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions, 2004-2015. 
 
Again, between 2008 and 2013, the largest losses are concentrated at the bottom 
of the income distribution, where average income in the bottom decile fell by 
more than 20 per cent on a BHC basis, or by more than 25 per cent on an AHC 
basis. Income changes tend to become smaller higher up the income distribution, 
with income losses higher than average for the bottom 60 per cent of the 
population (BHC), or bottom 70 per cent of the population (AHC). Income losses 
for the top 40 per cent (BHC) or top 30 per cent (AHC) were lower than average. 
Average real income grew in each decile between 2013 and 2015, with the largest 
gains concentrated at the bottom of the distribution, partially offsetting the larger 
than average losses for the lowest income households during the crisis.  
3.  MOVEMENTS IN HOUSEHOLD INCOME FROM YEAR TO YEAR 
Most work on trends in income inequality looks at snapshots of income 
distributions from year to year. This largely reflects the cross-sectional nature of 
the data available on income distribution. There is, however, additional 
information in the CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions which can shed 
light on how movements in individual incomes from year to year contribute to the 
observed patterns at household level. SILC has a ‘rotating panel’ design: in Year 2, 
it seeks to re-interview 75 per cent of the households interviewed in Year 1. 
Typically SILC achieves a re-interview in about two-thirds of these cases. Thus, for 
about half of the cases interviewed in Year 1, information is also provided on Year 
2 incomes.7 
 
                                                          
 
7  Ideally, we would follow households for more than one year. However, due to the combination of sample design and 
attrition, as few as 25 per cent of households in a given year of SILC can be followed for more than one year. 
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Given that income information for adjacent years is available for only half the 
sample, a key question is whether this half of the sample is broadly representative 
of the whole sample. Savage et al. (2017) find that, on a wide range of 
characteristics, the evidence suggests that the panel sample is broadly 
representative of the full sample. However, the combination of the rotating panel 
design, which drops one-quarter of the sample each year, and attrition, means 
that both the number of cases available for analysis and the issue of potential bias 
become much more problematic if attempting to follow households for more than 
one year. 
 
We use the available information on incomes in adjacent years in three ways.  
• First, we examine what this information tells us about the fall in the share of 
the bottom decile observed in cross-sectional data; 
• Second, we consider what happens to the incomes of those at a particular 
income level or decile at Year t when moving forward to Year t+1; 
• Third, we look again at those in a given income decile in Year t, and identify 
what has been the income change between Year t-1 and Year t. 
 
We noted in Section 2 that one of the key changes in the income distribution 
between 2008 and 2013 was a fall in the share of the bottom income decile, and a 
corresponding sharp fall in the mean income for that group.8  
 
In recent work, Savage et al. (2017) have identified more precisely the forces 
which generated the sharp fall in the income share of the bottom decile. They find 
that the sharpest falls in average income for the bottom decile were in 2009-2010 
and 2010-2011. Using the panel element of SILC, they found that for those who 
remained in the bottom decile in each of these years, incomes were stable or rose 
slightly. The fall in average income for the bottom decile was not due to a fall in 
income for those already in the bottom decile. Instead, it relates to sharp falls in 
income for those previously in deciles 2, 3 and above, which brought these 
individuals into the bottom decile 
 
 
                                                          
 
8  As noted by Callan et al. (2014), ‘comparisons of corresponding deciles in different years are not comparing the 
incomes of the same people but are instead comparing what might be termed “income positions”, e.g. the incomes 
of the poorest ten per cent in each year. Changes in composition (e.g. more of the bottom decile being unemployed 
or self-employed with very low incomes in the recession) can also affect the observed patterns.’  
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FIGURE 3  CHANGE IN AVERAGE INCOME BETWEEN YEAR T AND YEAR T+1, BY YEAR T DECILE  
 
Source: Analysis based on SILC 2004-2013. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates how the average income for individuals in a given household 
income decile in Year t increased or decreased in Year t+1. We group the three 
‘pre-recession’ years together, and then look at changes averaged over pairs of 
years, including 2009 to 2011, which had the sharpest falls in overall household 
income (in the years 2010 and 2011). The pattern is strikingly different from that 
provided by the usual snapshot analyses. There are substantial gains from year to 
year for the individuals that began in the lowest income deciles, while the 
greatest losses are for those that began in the top income decile. This broad 
pattern holds both in the pre-recession years, and during the period of recession 
and austerity. Moreover, similar patterns are found in other countries, such as 
Jenkins (2016) for the UK. 
 
One potential explanation for such patterns is that movements into the bottom 
decile and top decile tend to reflect temporary shocks to income, and that it is the 
reversal of such temporary shocks which generates large percentage gains at the 
bottom and large percentage losses at the top. Jenkins (2016) however, cautions 
against a simple interpretation of this type, as some sensitivity tests he conducts 
suggest that the ‘reversion to the mean’ story does not fit well with the data. 
Caution is also needed in interpreting the size of the gains at the bottom: the fact 
that average incomes for the bottom decile are so low means that even large 
percentage gains typically lead to upward movement only to the second or third 
income decile. 
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FIGURE 4  CHANGE IN AVERAGE INOME BETWEEN YEAR T-1 AND YEAR T, BY YEAR T DECILE  
 
Source: Analysis based on SILC 2004-2013. 
 
Figure 4 provides an alternative perspective, focusing on the recent (previous 
year) experience of households at different income positions (deciles). Thus, we 
look here at the average change in income over the previous year experienced by 
households who are currently in a given decile. The pattern now contrasts sharply 
with that of Figure 2 (which looked not at past income changes for the decile 
group, but the prospective changes in the following year). In Figure 2 we find that 
the greatest losses are at the lowest income deciles, and the largest gains are 
experienced by top income deciles. Broadly speaking, the contrast between 
Figures 2 and 3 arises because those who have arrived in the bottom decile are 
likely to have had a fall, while those who have arrived in the top are likely to have 
had an income rise. Given that some of these income ‘shocks’ are likely to be 
temporary, in the next period the individuals are likely to experience a change in 
the opposite direction. 
 
The patterns in Figure 4 may be of interest in the light of the findings of Whelan et 
al. (2016), who find that while income losses were greatest at the top and middle 
of the distribution, a measure of ‘economic stress’ shows greater increases in 
middle income groups. The Whelan et al. analysis, which is based on a series of 
cross-sections between 2008 and 2012, identifies a number of factors which may 
be relevant to the explanation of this combination of results. Two points from the 
present analysis are also relevant. First, the fact that results which take account of 
‘income net of housing costs’ remain similar to those for ‘income before housing 
costs’ suggests that the role of housing costs in explaining the contrast may be 
quite limited. Second, the analysis here identifies patterns of income mobility 
which could play a role in explaining the contrast. In particular, one might expect 
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that recent changes in income, as shown in Figure 4, could play a role in 
influencing patterns of economic stress.  
 
From an income perspective, further analysis of the trajectories for individual 
households within SILC will be of interest. It may also be helpful to examine 
results for countries which have a longer run of panel data, to get an 
understanding of how longer-range income dynamics work. 
4.  ASSESSING POLICY IMPACT: DISCRETIONARY POLICY AND 
AUTOMATIC STABILISATION 
A progressively designed tax-benefit system, when faced with an increase in 
unemployment and falling incomes, will automatically increase the level of state 
support to those affected through, for example, an increase in the number of 
individuals entitled to unemployment benefits and lower average tax rates on 
income. This is known as the automatic stabilisation effect of the tax-benefit 
system. When comparing the redistributive work done by a tax-benefit system 
over time however, discretionary changes to tax-benefit policy (for example, 
changes in the level of unemployment compensation available to the 
unemployed) also affect how much redistributive work is done by the tax-benefit 
system. In this section, we identify the balance between these two different 
elements – automatic stabilisation and discretionary changes in policy – on the 
overall change in the redistributive impact of the Irish tax-transfer system over 
the 2008 to 2013 period. 
 
Between 2008 and 2013 in Ireland, substantial changes were made to the tax-
benefit system as part of the austerity measures brought in in response to the 
crisis (specific changes have been well documented, see for example, Keane et al., 
2014). In addition, the crisis in Ireland resulted in significant changes in the 
structure of the population, with the unemployment rate increasing from just 
above 4 per cent to approximately 15 per cent in less than five years. We begin 
the section by examining how the overall impact of the tax-benefit system 
changed during the recession. We then examine how much of this work was due 
to discretionary changes in tax-benefit policy during the period, and how much 
can be attributed to automatic stabilisation. 
 
Table 4 shows the combined impact of the discretionary changes in policy and the 
impact of automatic stabilisation on the redistribution of income in 2008 (second 
column), 2013 (third column) and 2015 (final column). For each year, the top row 
of the table shows the Gini coefficient based on market income; that is, the 
distribution of income before any taxes are paid or transfers received. There is a 
marked increase in the inequality of the distribution of market income between 
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2008 and 2013 offset by a small reduction in 2015, with the Gini coefficient 
increasing from 0.52 to 0.59 between 2008 and 2013, falling back to 0.56 in 2015. 
The difference between the Gini based on market income and the Gini based on 
disposable income is known as the Reynolds-Smolensky (RS) index, and shows the 
overall reduction in inequality due to the tax-benefit system. Despite the marked 
increase in inequality of the distribution of market income between 2008 and 
2013, the Gini coefficient based on disposable income increased only 
marginally.9 This is due to an increase in the redistributive work of the tax-benefit 
system, with the RS index increasing from 0.21 to 0.27. Separating the impact of 
the tax system from the impact of the benefit system, the final two rows of the 
table show that the benefit system had approximately three times more 
redistributive power compared to the tax system in Ireland, though both 
components of the overall system served to reduce income inequality. With the 
fall in market income inequality between 2013 and 2015, the RS index also fell 
slightly to 0.25. 
 
TABLE 4 INCOME INEQUALITY MEASURES FOR MARKET, GROSS, DISPOSABLE INCOMES, AND 
REYNOLDS-SMOLENSKY INDICES, 2008 AND 2013 
  2008 2013 2015 
 Gini Coefficient 
Market 0.52 0.59 0.56 
Gross 0.36 0.39 0.38 
Disposable 0.31 0.32 0.31 
 Reynolds-Smolensky Index 
Taxes and Transfers 0.21 0.27 0.25 
of which:    
Taxes 0.05 0.07 0.07 
Transfers 0.16 0.20 0.18 
 
Source: Savage et al. (2017). 
 
The increased work of the tax-benefit system in 2013 compared to 2008 is the 
combined impact of discretionary changes to policy and automatic stabilisation. 
Savage et al. (2017) developed a formal decomposition method that separately 
identifies the contribution of discretionary policy and the contribution of 
automatic stabilisation to changes in overall levels of inequality between two 
points in time. Applying the methods to Ireland between 2008 and 2013, they 
showed that approximately 75 per cent of the increase in the index of 
redistribution (Reynolds-Smolenksy) was due to automatic stabilisation, and the 
remaining 25 per cent was due to discretionary changes in policy. This implies 
 
                                                          
 
9  Savage et al. (2017) show that the difference in the Gini coefficient between 2008 and 2013 is not statistically 
significant.  
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that, over the full 2008 to 2013 period, discretionary changes to direct tax and 
welfare policy during this period made a contribution towards offsetting the 
inequality-increasing influences of the crisis, as measured by the Gini coefficient; 
but that the major role in this regard was played by the pre-existing structure of 
the Irish tax and welfare system.  
 
Figure 5 examines the impact of discretionary policy during the period in greater 
detail, showing the distributional impact of the set of austerity budgets between 
2008 and 2013 on a fixed population.10 Discretionary policy changes during this 
period included reductions in nominal levels of working-age welfare payments, 
reduction in income tax bands and credits, the introduction of the Universal Social 
Charge, and the introduction of the Local Property Tax.11 
 
The impact of discretionary policy during the period varied across the income 
distribution.12 The largest impact is at the top decile, where discretionary policy 
resulted in a 14 per cent reduction in income. The next largest impact is at the 
bottom of the income distribution, where the bottom two deciles lost just over 10 
per cent of income. The 9th decile also suffered a loss of income of just over 10 per 
cent. Income losses in the middle of the income distribution were slightly lower, 
with income in deciles 3 to 8 declining by between 8 and 9 per cent. Broadly 
speaking, welfare changes play the main role in driving changes at the bottom of 
the distribution, while tax and public sector pay changes dominate for the top of 
the distribution. 
 
 
                                                          
 
10  Figure 1 is based on the 2013 population and income levels. A similar analysis on the 2008 population and income 
levels produces similar results. More details can be found in Savage et al. (2017). 
11  See Callan et al. (2013) for full details on the range of discretionary policy changes made during the period. In this 
paper, we do not include the impact of indirect tax reforms, such as reforms to VAT, Carbon Tax, or DIRT. Callan et al. 
(2013) draw on existing research to include an approximation of the impact of such reforms, while Savage (2017) 
analyses the possibility of extending the SWITCH database to allow for analysis of indirect tax reforms.  
12  Figure 5 shows the combined impact of reforms to tax and welfare schemes. Similar to the analysis of the RS index 
above, we can separate the distributional impact of tax reforms from welfare reforms using the SWITCH model. This 
is an area for future research. 
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FIGURE 5 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF DISCRETIONARY CHANGES IN DIRECT TAX AND WELFARE POLICY, 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY DECILE, BUDGETS 2009-2013 
 
 
Source: Analysis based on SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit microsimulation model. 
 
The tax-benefit system played an important role in offsetting increases in the 
inequality of the market income distribution during the crisis in Ireland. Even in 
the absence of any discretionary changes to tax-benefit policy during the period, 
substantially more people became dependent on welfare support, thereby 
increasing the redistributive work done by the tax-benefit system. This automatic 
stabilisation was responsible for the majority of the additional work done by the 
tax-benefit system in offsetting inequality increases. Analysis done here, 
complementing research by Savage et al. (2017), shows that discretionary policy 
changes also offset part of the increase in market income inequality, as measured 
by the Gini coefficient. Detailed analysis of the impact of discretionary policy 
however showed that the reduction in income due to these policy changes varied 
across the income distribution; the largest losses in income were concentrated at 
the extremes of the income distribution, resulting in income declines of up to 11 
per cent at the bottom and up to 14 per cent at the top of the distribution.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings point to a more nuanced view of the impact of the recession, and of 
tax-transfer policy, than has been available heretofore. There is no simple single 
answer to the question ‘Where did the burden fall?’. Instead, the answer to this 
question depends on the frame of reference. 
 
The standard approach internationally is to assess inequality in incomes using 
cross-sectional or ‘snapshot’ evidence for pre-recession and end-recession years 
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(2008 and 2013). On this approach, the greatest losses are at the bottom, with 
lower losses in the middle reaches of the distribution, and the lowest losses at the 
top of the income distribution. There is also a small rise in the Gini coefficient, 
though this is not statistically significant. Updating these results with the latest 
available microdata on the distribution of incomes, real income at the bottom of 
the income distribution increased by more than average between 2013 and 2015, 
partially offsetting larger than average losses during the crisis.  
 
An alternative approach looks at income changes from one year to the next. On 
this basis, between 2008 and 2013 the greatest losses are at the top of the 
income distribution, with lower losses for middle income deciles, and gains in 
particular for the bottom income decile. This pattern is common internationally. 
 
Looking at policy impacts, we find that discretionary policy imposed losses which 
were greatest at the top and bottom of the income distribution with smaller 
losses in the middle income groups. However, the overall impact of policy on 
inequality is strongly influenced by the automatic stabilisation features of the 
tax/transfer system, such as the provision of unemployment compensation to 
those losing jobs. The combined impact of discretionary and automatic 
stabilisation components greatly limited the rise in inequality, as measured by the 
Gini coefficient. 
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